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Military, Political and Economic Data

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CONFIDENTIAL

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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DATA

CONTENTS

Military

PLA Urged to Heighten Political, War Preparedness (CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 10 Nov 74)	1
Border Radar Unit Heightens War Preparedness (CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 20 Nov 74)	3
Army Paper Denounces Lin Piao Tactics (CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO date unknown)	5
Principle of Party Control over Army Reaffirmed (CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 10 Nov 74)	17
Conference Reviews Training, Calls for Improvement (CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 16 Nov 74)	26
Unit 6427 Tank Company Stresses War Preparedness (CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 20 Nov 74)	23
PLA Unit Information, Designations	29
PLA Cadre Participate in Military Construction Projects (CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 20 Nov 74)	30

Political

Peking Militia Active in Current Class Struggle (CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 20 Nov 74)	31
PLA Company Works Out Personnel Problems (CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 23 Nov 74)	33

Plant Data

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1

MILITARY

PLA URGED TO HEIGHTEN POLITICAL, WAR PREPAREDNESS

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAPER 10 Nov 74 p 1

[Editorial: "Earnestly Do Good Work in Winter Marching and Training"]

[Text] The winter season has arrived. All units of our army are continuously engaging in marching and training. Great leader Chairman Mao is very concerned about the building of our army. He has repeatedly directed that we must engage in marching and training. By vigorously carrying out these activities in recent years, our army has achieved very outstanding success. Troop units have come out of their barracks and developed broad contacts with the masses. They have held combined war preparedness maneuvers under conditions approximating actual combat, thus further tempering militarily and politically the cadres and fighters. Various work tasks have been further tested and enhanced. Our army's revolutionary tradition of struggling under hardship has been further manifested. Relations between officers and soldiers and between the army and the people have been further cemented. Chairman Mao's glorious concept of a people's army and people's war was brought into full play. Experience shows that the training and marching carried out by our troop units represented an important reform in our army's training work, a resolute implementation of Chairman Mao's military line, and an important measure insuring that our army will retain the characteristics of a people's army and increase its fighting strength.

At present, the situation at home and abroad is very favorable. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, the movement to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius in our country has achieved very great success.

The situation on various battlefronts is improving steadily.

The state of perpetual chaos on the international scene is becoming more and more beneficial to our development and more and more detrimental to that of the enemy. But the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are still engaged in arms expansion and intensifying competition between them. Soviet revisionism, especially, refuses to give up the pursuit to destroy us and is stationing troops along our borders to threaten our country. Our army must raise the level of its vigilance and strengthen its preparedness for antiaggression war. We must earnestly do well in our marching and training tasks, further put into full effect Chairman Mao's strategic policies "be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people," and "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony," so as to safeguard our great socialist motherland and make new contributions to consolidate and expand our favorable situations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

In our marching and training, we must earnestly and persistently study the works of Marx, Lenin, and Chairman Mao and steadily carry out in great depth the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. We must continue to criticize the counterrevolutionary revisionist line of Lin Piao; we must especially study the military writings of Chairman Mao. In conjunction with our study of the struggle between the legalist and the Confucian military concepts, we must thoroughly criticize the bourgeois military line of Lin Piao, criticize the "six tactical principles in combat" in his right opportunist line, and his crimes in sabotaging the building of our army. We must take advantage of the favorable conditions for marching and training, and in conjunction with the class struggle and the line struggle going on at present and with pertinent combat history and combat examples, we must study and carry out criticism with the masses. Through study and criticism, we must further recognize the counterrevolutionary nature of Lin Piao, deepen our understanding of the party's basic line, and heighten the level of our awareness in implementing Chairman Mao's proletarian military line.

To promote unity is an important part of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and our army's basic guarantee for victory. In carrying out marching and training, it is necessary to have unity between officers and soldiers and between the army and the people, to manifest the glorious tradition of showing respect for cadres and love for soldiers and of supporting the government and loving the people, and to further cement mutual understanding and relations between upper and lower levels, between the old and the new cadres, between fraternal units, between military units and local areas, and between military units and the people. We must adhere to Chairman Mao's teaching that "the liberation army should learn from the people of the whole country," patiently study the advanced concepts and advanced experience of the proletariat and the lower-middle peasants in grasping revolution and promoting production. Everywhere they go, the liberation army must vigorously promote the directives and the policies of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, and they must learn how to do work for the masses. Every comrade must strictly observe the "three main rules of discipline and eight points for attention" and become an exemplary model in consciously obeying the policies, laws, and orders of the party and the state.

We must carry out training with strict standards and strict requirements. We must train our troops to march, fight, eat, and camp properly and our cadres and organizations to organize and command our troops properly in accordance with actual combat requirements. In conjunction with the combat responsibilities of our troop units and in accordance with the special characteristics of the enemy, it is especially necessary to strengthen our research and training in combat against tanks, in firing at airplanes, and in fighting airborne troops. We must also pay attention to night training.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3

To do well in marching and training is an important part or practicing Chairman Mao's military line and a task requiring the full attention of party committee and party branches at all levels. We must thoroughly mobilize ourselves and explain the significance of our mobilization so that every cadre and every soldier will act positively. We must earnestly summarize and draw our experience in marching and training. We must better handle the relationship between training during marches and training during camping, between studying political affairs and military affairs, between training to march and training to fight, and between training troop units and training headquarters organizations; we must take timely actions to solve various contradictions. We must do well in political-ideological work and in managing education and pay attention to safeguarding security. We must strengthen our freeze-prevention measures and ensure the health of our troops. Leadership cadres at all levels must manifest the excellent style of uniting closely with the masses. We must learn from the masses as if we are ordinary soldiers, but we must also do well in training, leading, and assisting our troops.

Comrades of the entire armed forces, let us join in a common effort, victoriously complete this year's winter marching and training, and strive for excellent results!

BORDER RADAR UNIT HEIGHTENS WAR PREPAREDNESS

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 20 Nov 74

[Article: "Maintain A High Degree of Revolutionary Vigilance, Be Firm In Doing A Good Job At War Preparedness"]

[Text] During the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, and in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions to "heighten our vigilance, defend the motherland," the party branch of the third radar company of a certain air force unit stationed on the grasslands of Inner Mongolia has conscientiously carried out war preparedness education, has been firm in doing a good job in their war preparedness work, and has done a comparatively good job at completing the war preparedness duties assigned to the company.

During the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, the party branch of the third company has attached particular significance to combining the unmasking and repudiation of Soviet revisionism and strengthening its war preparedness education. They organized the cadres and fighters to repeatedly study the party's basic line and intensively repudiate the traitor Lin Piao's crimes of imitating Confucius' [ideal of] "restrain oneself and restore the rites," and vainly attempting to restore capitalism and going over to Soviet revisionism and social-imperialism. They fully unmasked the Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4

revisionists' vicious attacks on our movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, their farce of going all out to praise Confucius and oppose China, and their plot to intensify their military expansion and war preparations while claiming to support "detente" and "disarmament." Their studies and criticisms led them to understand that Confucius' restoration of the rites, Lin Piao's restoration [of capitalism], and the Soviet revisionists' desire to invade [China] were all parts of the same reactionary ideological system. The comrades were unanimous in expressing their belief that, not only must the flagrant crimes of Lin Piao, Confucius, and Soviet revisionism be thoroughly criticized and discredited in the political and ideological sense, but they must, in their actions, constantly raise their revolutionary vigilance, do a good job in all their war preparedness work, and be prepared at all times to annihilate all enemies who dare to attack.

The war preparedness education improved the commanders' and fighters' concept of war preparedness and stirred up the enthusiasm of the masses [of commanders and fighters]. In order to accumulate materials or radar images and raise their ability to distinguish between the various types of aircraft and determine the number of aircraft in a sortie, the fighters of the [radar] operators platoon [2347 4912 2226] enthusiastically made suggestions and put forth ideas and they ended up using graph paper to draw the images of aircraft as they appear on the radar screen, and from these they noted the special characteristics and analyzed the special features of the return signals produced by every type of aircraft. In this way, the military technical skills of the whole platoon were raised to a new level, and they earned the rating of excellent [highest of the four ratings] in the test held in the first half of this year. Inspired by the example set by the operators platoon, the entire company was filled with enthusiasm for training. The radio operators' squad has very few operators but it has a heavy load of duties assigned to it. Still, they pledged to successfully complete all of their tasks, while at the same time using all opportunities they could to carry out training, and the result was that they raised their level of skill in both sending and receiving. The cadres of the company set themselves up as examples for others to emulate. Wang T'ien-shen, for example, the company's political officer, paid attention to seeing to it that he underwent training with his squad. He was very conscientious in doing his own ideological and political work, but he also learned from the fighters and did his utmost to master certain military skills.

Through their timely and conscientious grasping of war preparedness education, the third radar company has consistently done a comparatively good job in carrying out their war preparedness work. Over the past few years, they have frequently provided accurate and important information and have received praise from higher-level organs, and throughout this period a total of 11 comrades have been singled out for meritorious service.

CONFIDENTIAL

ARMY PAPER DENOUNCES LIN PIAO TACTICS

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO date unknown, possibly 16 Nov 74

[Article: "Product of Opportunism, Tactics of Defeatism" by the theoretical group of Unit 3096]

[Text] In order to counter Chairman Mao's military line and his strategic and tactical principles, the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, counterrevolutionary double-dealer, renegade and traitor Lin Piao dished up the so-called "six tactical principles." The "six tactical principles" are the product of right opportunism which was pushed by Lin Piao and are typical idealism and mechanicalism with regard to the problem of fighting.

During the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius we have seriously studied Chairman Mao's military works, and from a high level of the struggle between the two kinds of military thinking and the two military lines, carried out criticism of the "six tactical principles." Using a question and answer format we have written down our understanding [of the issues] which we gained through study and criticism so that together with everyone we can study, discuss and energetically and effectively carry out a campaign to criticize Lin Piao's bourgeois military line.

Question: What are Lin Piao's "six tactical principles?" Why are they so harmful?

Answer: At the time of the War of Liberation in the Northeast, Lin Piao from the end of 1945 to 1948 fabricated in succession his so-called "six tactical principles," namely the tactics of "one point, two sides," "three-three system," "three fierce actions," "three kinds of situations and three methods of fighting," "four fast and one slow" and "four groups in one team."

The main harm of Lin Piao's "six tactical principles" was to counter Chairman Mao's 10 great principles of operation by agitating for fighting battles to rout the enemy and fighting battles to exhaust the enemy and by opposing wars of annihilation.

As for the balance of forces, the so-called "six tactical principles" opposed the principle of our having an absolute superiority over the enemy forces in battle; in the deployment of force it opposed encircling the enemy on all sides; in the use of force it advocated "concentrating seven-ninths to eight-ninths" of the forces at the "point" and placing "two-ninths or at least one-ninth" of the forces on the "side," thus making for an absolute concentration of force at the "point". In other words the "tactic of one point, two sides" was opposed to the principle advocated by Chairman Mao that "in every battle, concentrate

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6

an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net."

The so-called "tactic of four fast and one slow" (i.e., prepare quickly, advance quickly, exploit the victory quickly and pursue quickly;" when beginning a general assault move slowly") strongly publicized the word "slow" and clamored that no matter what changes occurred in the situation or the assignment "in any case only if we are well prepared, can we fight" and if preparations are not done well, then there would be no "fighting," "you have a thousand plans and I have the reliable principle." Standing on the side of right opportunism, Lin Biao used the so-called "preparations" to negate combat initiative, abandon combat initiative, destroy the whole situation and passively avoid battle and pushed military conservatism and military departmentalism and thus opposed the principle advocated by Chairman Mao "fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning."

The so-called "three kinds of situations and three methods of fighting" subjectively viewed a battle situation which was very confused and constantly changing as the three situations of being on the defensive, retreating or wanting to retreat but unable to retreat and correspondingly put forward the so-called three methods of fighting which were not wanting to fight a sloppy battle, wanting to fight a sloppy battle and half fighting a sloppy battle. This so-called tactic which was piecemeal and unfit, one minute emphasized not daring to fight and the next minute advocated disorderly fighting. Not only did it not express objective laws in a battle situation but it also did not present the correct fighting methods in a decisive battle, therefore it is obviously a hodge-podge of military conservatism and military adventurism.

The so-called "three fierce actions tactic" (i.e., fierce fighting, fierce clashes and fierce pursuit) advocated taking "fierceness" to represent tactics and nonsensically stated that "the most important tactic of all tactics is to fight to the death," "fighting to the last man is to fight to the last man" "destruction is destruction." This kind of fighting to the death which did not speak of tactics, which was confused clashing that was foolhardy, this pursuit to the end which was "six of one thing and half a dozen of another," denies "both intelligence and bravery" and intentionally distorted the spirit of revolutionary heroism into military desperadoism. It was an out and out sabotage of the excellent fighting style of our army.

The so-called "tactic of the three-three system" mechanically defined the organization of the combat group, the infantry squad and the front and rear triangular formation which had long been employed by

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7

our army as the "three-three system." Moreover, it was proposed as the "tactic" which had to be used in every kind of situation and completely threw out the principle calling for flexible use on the basis of the assignment, the enemy's condition and the topographical situation at that time. This obviously was a thing which was absolute and formalized.

The so-called "tactic of four groups in one team" mechanically defined the method of organizing shock troops which was flexibly applied in combat when storming heavily fortified points, a method which has long been used by our army, as "four groups in one team" (i.e., one company set up as four groups: a fire power group, a shock group, an explosives group and a support group which together made up one team) and denied the prerequisite conditions of the special characteristics of the enemy's defenses, topographical conditions and our army's equipment and fighting strategems. It was the same as the "tactics of the three-three system" and was also a thing which was absolute and formalized.

Question: What is the historical background in which the "six tactical principles" made their appearance?

Answer: Lin Piao's "six tactical principles" were not put forward as a whole but rather presented in parts. Some also underwent several revisions. In December of 1945, having been in the Northeast just over one month and only having fought the "first battle," Lin Piao put forward the tactics of one point, two sides and the three-three system; in September of 1946 in the so-called "Important Points of the Directive" he presented the three fierce actions; in April of 1947 before the Northeast summer offensive, he put forward the three kinds of situations and the three methods of fighting; in 1947 after the siege of Ssu-p'ing, he also put forward the "four fast, one slow;" in April of 1948 he also put forward the "four groups in one team." Within this period of more than two years when Lin Piao put forward the "six tactical principles," what, after all, were the fighting conditions at that time?

After the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, the reactionary clique of Chiang Kai-shek actively prepared to launch a counter-revolutionary civil war. In December of 1945 Chiang Kai-shek's army, which had been transported to the Northeast, occupied Shanhaikuan, Hu-lu Island and Chin-chou. Regarding this kind of situation Chairman Mao had early pointed out that "if the Kuomintang still wants to start a civil war, it will lose its rights before the whole country and the whole world. Our party has the right to pursue a self-defensive war and to repel their attack." "We absolutely must not let the bluster of the reactionary clique be heard." However, starting from a position of right opportunism and estimating the enemy's strength high and the revolutionaries' strength low, Lin Piao, who was in the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8

Northeast, exaggerated the temporary difficulties and did not dare to actively engage in war. He feared the enemy as if he were faced by a tiger when confronted with an enemy attack. He disregarded Chairman Mao's directive concerning "yield the main road but occupy the territory on both sides," was unwilling to leave the city, and opposed the guiding policy for waging war which took the annihilation of the enemy's effective strength as the main goal. In the beginning he daydreamed of peace, clamored for "standing pat" and "patience" and then pessimistically lost hope, was forced to passively engage in battle, agitated for fighting a "hard, all out battle," wanted to fight a "battle in which everyone's life was risked" and moreover said that this was the "general policy for waging war." His "tactic of one point, two sides" was one which served this erroneous policy. Please look at Lin Piao's interpretation: "the enemy which we have encountered was not a common, unruly army but rather it was Chiang Kai-shek's expeditionary force, one which was trained and equipped by the United States, one which was comparatively strong in quality. At the same time the Northeast had many railroads and movement of troops was very fast. Thus one division could be the equivalent of several divisions." "After" we "concentrated the force at the one point, if an unexpected situation should occur, it would be easy to take control and deal with the situation," otherwise, "there will be a great deal of trouble." "If the military force is ample, then there is no fear of an unexpected enemy counterattack. If, however, the military force is scattered, an unexpected enemy counterattack could force us to lose suddenly." These words spoken on this one occasion completely described for the whole world Lin Piao's deep right-deviationist feeling of fear of the enemy!

On 16 September 1946 Chairman Mao issued his directive "Concentrate A Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One" and set forth the important method for our army to be victorious over Chiang Kai-shek's attack. On the Northeast battlefield our army, going through the summer, autumn, and winter offensives, forced the Chiang army to fall into a strategic defense. From July to September 1947 our army settled into a nation-wide counterattack. Under this situation Chairman Mao clearly pointed out in "Strategy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation" that "the keys to victory in fighting in the Kuomintang areas are, first, to be good at seizing the opportunities for fighting, to be brave and determined and to win as many battles as possible." On many occasions Chairman Mao also directed Lin Piao by telegram saying you must actively wage war. Only if the policy of courageously attacking is adopted can there be a road to victory. But Lin Piao disregarded Chairman Mao's above-mentioned directive and in the summer of 1947 he fabricated the so-called "tactic of four fast and one slow" and said that "the main word is slow." Behind the scenes of this "slow" Lin Piao not only repeatedly committed errors of throwing away combat initiatives but also rejected Chairman Mao's directive that many great wars of annihilation must be fought in the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9

Northeast and thus suppressed the enthusiasm of the broad masses of commanders and fighters to wage war. He said that if you actively wage war, you can draw a great many Kuomintang troops into the Northeast. If you fight too soon then you will encumber yourself. This would be detrimental to the Northeast." With this single remark Lin Piao exposed his passive avoidance of war and his devious caution by which he profited at the expense of others.

In December of 1947 Chairman Mao issued the 10 great principles of operation. This was an important method for our army to defeat Chiang Kai-shek. But within a year after the 10 great principles of operation were issued, Lin Piao, while reporting and issuing directives on waging war, did not mention one word about the 10 great principles of operation, contrarily he clamored more than ever that "the basic conditions for victory over the enemy" "depends on the implementation of one point, two sides, the three-three system and four fast and one slow operations" and with every effort peddled his "six tactical principles" taking the passive avoidance of war as the starting point and the battle to rout the enemy as the guiding ideology. This fully explained the appearance of Lin Piao's "six tactical principles." They were basically opposed to Chairman Mao's military thinking and to the guiding principle for waging war and were completely the product of a right opportunist political line and a bourgeois military line.

Question: Why is it said that the "six military principles" serve a right opportunist line?

Answer: Chairman Mao has said: "Military affairs are but one tool to accomplish a political task" and the military principle is "one which is linked directly with the fundamental political principle." This tells us that military affairs serve politics. The struggle between the two military lines is a reflection within the military of the struggle between the two political lines within the party. Lin Piao's pessimistic estimate of the military situation resulted in his being a right deviationist conservative in military affairs. The so-called "six tactical principles" directly served his right opportunist political line.

Since the liberation of the whole country, especially since 1960, Lin Piao had utilized power and position which he had usurped to even more wildly peddle his "six tactical principles" and in addition he illegally inserted the "six tactical principles" into the orders and regulations and set them up as the basic contents of tactical training for the units. In order to raise the position of the "six tactical principles," Lin Piao boasted everywhere that "the skills are the five basic skills and tactics are the three-three system, the one point, two sides, the four groups in one team, the four fast and one slow and the three kinds of situations and three methods of fighting" and wanted the units to study the "six tactical principles" the same as they studied the five basic skills. In 1962 in order to ballyhoo the "one point, two sides and the three-three system" into a "dialectic method" he shamelessly

CONFIDENTIAL

used Chiang Kai-shek to exalt himself saying "Chiang has read it five times and has told his troops to study it." Especially on the eve of the Second Plenary Session of the Party's Ninth Central Committee, three months after Lin Piao successively had written on several reactionary scrolls "restrain oneself and restore the rites," Lin Piao's anti-party clique arranged to print behind the back of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee the so-called black book ON TACTICAL THINKING AND THE STYLE OF FIGHTING which has for its contents the "six tactical principles." The printed quantity and quality and the circulation of the book surpassed CHAIRMAN MAO'S SIX MILITARY WORKS. Lin Piao also boasted that this book "was a study of warfare and military affairs which included Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" and "was thoroughly imbued with military dialectics." By combining Lin Piao's "six tactical principles and the rest of Lin Piao's ballyhooed black books, black articles, and black reports with his plan, the "Outline of Project 571," for an armed counterrevolutionary coup d'etat and analyzing this, we can clearly see that Lin Piao and his ilk freely published the "six tactical principles." This was by no means an isolated affair but rather was an important component of the counterrevolutionary plots and intrigues which had been secretly planned for a long time. They stubbornly peddled the "six tactical principles" and pushed the bourgeois military line. Their evil goal was a juggling act of Confucius' "rectification of names" in order to dress up Lin Piao as a "military genius" and create a counterrevolutionary public opinion so as to usurp the party's military power by a "deception in terminology," subvert the bourgeois dictatorship and restore capitalism.

Question: Why do we say Lin Piao's "six tactical principles" are a distortion of and a tampering with Chairman Mao's ten great principles of operation?

Answer: Lin Piao and his ilk, in order to use the "six tactical principles" in place of Chairman Mao's ten great principles of operation, and to use Lin Piao's bourgeois military thinking in place of Chairman Mao's proletarian military thinking, babbled that the "six tactical principles" were the "concrete application" of Chairman Mao's ten great principles of operation. Actually, Lin Piao's "six tactical principles" were a distortion of, a tampering with, and a negation of Chairman Mao's ten great principles of operation. It is common knowledge that the basic general line for our armed forces as set forth by Chairman Mao during the War of Liberation was the war of annihilation. As early as the Second Revolutionary Civil War period, Chairman Mao, after undergoing the experience of the revolutionary struggle, formulated a complete methodology for fighting wars of annihilation. In December 1947, the ten great principles of operation set forth by Chairman Mao, which have at their core the concentration of superior military forces to fight wars of annihilation, further unified our armies' operational guiding theories. Chairman Mao specifically pointed out: these principles "are the main methods the Peoples' Liberation Army has

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

11

employed in defeating Chiang Kai-shek." However, in the battles of the Northeast, Lin Piao came up with another set of "six tactical principles" which had routing the enemy as their leading theory, saying nonsensically that these principles alone were the "basic method of fighting victorious wars." In the three years he was in the Northeast, on four occasions Lin Piao lectured on tactical questions before meetings of the middle and upper echelon military cadres, and all he ever tried to peddle were his own "six tactical principles", and never once mentioned carrying out Chairman Mao's military theories or operational principles. It is obvious that his so-called "concrete application" was nothing but sham and lies.

Let us approach the question of fighting wars of annihilation by seeing how Lin Piao concretely distorted, tampered with, and negated Chairman Mao's operational principles. On the form of battle to be used in fighting wars of annihilation, Chairman Mao pointed out: "Strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare," and at the same time, he greatly emphasized positional warfare where the conditions were optimal. Lin Piao, on the other hand, agitated for fighting the so-called "dignified battles" of positional warfare, prattling that to fight positional warfare was more "profitable" than mobile warfare, clamoring that mobile war was a "dispersion of troop strength." In reference to preparation for fighting, Chairman Mao pointed out: "Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning," Lin Piao fabricated the so-called "four fasts and one slow" tactic, and was most adept with "slowness", missing many opportunities in battle, losing many chances to take the initiative, destroying the general situation. In regards to battle deployment, Chairman Mao pointed out: "In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. "Lin Piao touted the tactics of "one point and two sides," causing an absolute concentration of forces on the "point" and an absolute dispersion of forces on the "sides," destroying the concentration of forces, opposing the encirclement from four sides, and promoting fighting battles to rout the enemy forces and wars of attrition. In regards to the style of fighting, Chairman Mao pointed out that we should display the revolutionary spirit of "courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice." Lin Piao did his best to sell his "three fierce actions tactics," always putting the emphasis on "fighting to the death" and "do or die," advocating military desperadoism, distorting revolutionary heroism. Other than this, to stipulate "four groups and one team" as the only battle organization, to make use of the "three-three system" as the only battle formation, and to employ "three situations and three ways of fighting" in battle situations, is to defy the spirit of Chairman Mao's flexible application of principles according to the situation, and is a totally idealistic and mechanistic approach to problems of fighting.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

12

approach to problems of fighting.

Question: What sort of deceitful tactics did Lin Piao use to peddle his "six tactical principles?"

Answer: In his criticism of the renegade Kautsky, Lenin pointed out: "Kautsky first tried sleight of hand, using obvious lies to castrate the revolutionary vital soul of Marxism." Lin Piao used just such sophistry and sleight of hand in order to tamper with Chairman Mao's military thinking and with Chairman Mao's guiding battle principle of concentrating an overwhelming superiority of forces to fight wars of annihilation. He insisted that his "six tactical principles" which had battles to rout the enemy and battles of attrition as their specific characteristics, were "the only methods which conformed with Marxist thought (Marxist theories concerning major contradictions or central propositions)." Some "only methods"! The principles in their basics deny wars of annihilation, and he still seriously talked about the "major contradictions;" they eliminated the concentration of overwhelming forces, and he still hypocritically spoke of grasping the "central propositions" -- other than an itinerant "quack" like Lin Piao, who could spout such "hogwash"?

"When changing Marxism into opportunism, the easiest way to fool the masses is to substitute eclecticism for dialectics." (Lenin: THE STATE AND REVOLUTION: page 20). Lin Piao's "six tactical principles" are crammed with this type of eclecticism from beginning to end. For instance, on the question of the concentration of forces, Chairman Mao points out: "The method of fighting by concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one must be employed not only in the disposition of troops for a campaign, but also in the disposition of troops for a battle." Lin Piao, however, said: "Strategically use concentration of forces, in campaigns use 'one point and two sides,' but tactically, and for battlefield movements, such would be a dispersion of forces." See? Lin Piao takes two completely different viewpoints on the concentration of forces and mixes them up together, agreeing with the first and absolutely denying the second; this is a basic disregarding of Chairman Mao's principles concerning the concentration of forces. Again, on the question of not fighting a battle unprepared and not fighting a battle which you are unsure of winning, the spirit of Chairman Mao's instruction is that there should be an extremely detailed plan for every battle fought, preparations should be wholly adequate, and the victory should be built upon a firm and reliable base; if you don't fight, it is up to you, but if you do fight, then wipe them out. Lin Piao, however, brought out his so-called "four fast and one slow" tactic, and divided and distorted the internal relationships between total preparations and guarantee of winning by using the word "slowly". In this manner, his starting point was passivity and avoidance of battle, he always emphasized the word "slowly" and thus "slowly"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

13

became a synonym for hindering military operations and destroying the overall situation.

The denial of the objectivity of truth and the employment of pragmatism are also hallmarks of Lin Piao's "six tactical principles." Take the principle "one point and two sides" for instance: what is meant by "one point?" Lin Piao sometimes said the one point was "the direction of battle," "the direction of the main attack," at other times he said it was "the main point of attack" "the point of assault," at other times and places he said it was a point along the front of the enemy positions, and at still other times said that it was a certain attackable point in the depths of the enemy's positions. Secondly, what are the "two sides"? Lin Piao sometimes spoke of "one point and two sides," sometimes, said nothing but "one point and two sides" is permissible; at times he said "one point and many sides," and "at least two sides;" at times he even said "three or four sides" was acceptable, that "a point without any sides" was allowed, that "many points and many sides" were also possible, that it was possible to have "sides within the point, and points within the sides." Finally, how was the "one point and two sides" tactic to be carried out? Lin Piao sometimes would say that it should be used only in the area of tactics, at other times that it could also be employed in the area of strategy; then again, he would say that "it should be employed by commanders at all levels in a battle," and then would say that "the troops in a battle can have one point and no sides." Lin Piao was an archetypical pragmatist; in order to peddle his black goods, if he needed something, he would emphasize that thing; if some aspect seemed needed, that aspect was promulgated, and, as a result, he contradicted himself and his logic was befuddled; the more he spoke, the less sense he made; the more he explained, the more ambiguous he became. The old pragmatist once babbled: "Truth is made by men for their own use." Lin Piao also said: "Tactic should serve me." The two are in sharp contrast: how can they be identical?

Question: Which basic principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought regarding the determination of battle tactics are defied by Lin Piao's "six tactical principles?"

Answer: What can be used as a standard in judging whether tactical principles are correct or erroneous? In the main, differentiation should be made according to the following several aspects:

Viewed from the basis which produces the tactics: Marxism holds that new military sciences are the necessary products of new social relationships, and new forces of production are the prerequisites of every new advance in methods of fighting wars. This is to say, the formulation of tactics is not a subjective personal creation, neither are tactics rigid and unchanging, but, having their basis in material things, change in accordance with the conditions of development, first of all in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

14

accordance with the development of production. In defining strategy and tactics for our armed forces, Chairman Mao combined the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete experience of the Chinese revolution, and, in accordance with the class nature and technical and armament level of our troops, set forth the only correct tactics and strategy, and these became the magic weapons by which our troops defeated the enemy and achieved victory. The "six tactical principles" concocted by Lin Piao ignored the class nature of peoples' war and the essence of peoples' war, lost touch with the objective reality of our troops which at that time were weak in numbers, training and armament while the enemy was strong, were a completely subjective personal creation, and were the tactics of defeatism.

Viewed from the relationship between tactics and strategy: Very early on, Chairman Mao pointed out: "The notion that strategical victory is conditional upon tactical victories is erroneous." This says to us: tactics are subordinate to strategy, each different stage in the permutations of strategy necessitates a corresponding alteration in tactical methodology. For instance, during the Second Revolutionary Civil War period, during the initial period of employment of guerrilla war strategies, Chairman Mao set forth the 16 point decision: "When the enemy attacks we retreat; when the enemy camps, we harrass; when the enemy tires, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue;" during the later period of mobile warfare (heightened guerrilla warfare) strategy, he set forth the warfare methodology calling for "luring the enemy in deep" and concentrating forces to fight mobile war. In contradiction to this, the so-called tactics of "attacking along the whole front," "dividing the troops over six routes," "blockhouse warfare," and "short swift thrusts" all disregarded basic material fact that the enemy at that time was strong and we were weak, all defied the correct general strategic policies of that time, and so were erroneous tactics. During the period of the War of Resistance, Chairman Mao set forth the general policy of "independent guerrilla operations in the mountain areas" and guerrilla tactics which conformed with this general strategic policy were the best tactics. In contrast to these, those tactics which were touted as coordinating with the Kuomintang to fight a great war, to fight a so-called "conventional" war were erroneous. During the War of Liberation, Chairman Mao stipulated the general strategy of concentrating an overwhelming superiority of forces to fight wars of annihilation. Thus, correct tactical principles must of necessity have conformed with the general strategy of concentrating an overwhelming superiority of forces and annihilating the enemy forces one by one. However, Lin Piao's "six tactical principles" flew in the face of Chairman Mao's general line of strategy, were tactics wholly designed for fighting battles to rout the enemy forces, for fighting wars of attrition, and thus were erroneous tactics.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15

Viewed from the point of whether or not they complied with the principle of preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy: Chairman Mao says: "The principle of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy is the basis of all military principles." "All technical principles and all principles concerning tactics, campaigns, and strategy represent applications of this basic principle." In order to affect this idea, the most important factor is to be thoroughly familiar with the situation on both our side and on the enemy's side, to discover the laws governing action in this situation, and then apply these laws to one's own movements; which is to say, begin with the special characteristics of the Chinese revolutionary struggle, and from this produce our strategy and tactics. Chairman Mao's ten great principles of operation, which have as their core the concentration of overwhelming superior forces to annihilate the enemy, penetratingly illuminated the objective laws of a peoples' war, and were totally in conformity with the principles of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy. In contrast, Lin Piao's "six tactical principles" were divorced from the actual conditions of our side and the enemy's side, were completely foreign to the special characteristics of the Chinese revolutionary struggle; either he would commit military conservatism and not dare to fight, or he would engage in military deperadoism and fight recklessly, and as a result, could neither destroy large numbers of the enemy nor effectively preserve his own troops.

Question: What was the connection between the series of battles of annihilation our troops fought in the Northeastern Provinces and the six military principles of Lin Piao?

Answer: During the War of Liberation, our armies fought a series of battles of annihilation. These were a great victory for Chairman Mao's thinking on the strategy and tactics of a peoples' war. To say that the wars of annihilation our troops fought in the Northeast according to Chairman Mao's military thinking were a good application of Lin Piao's "six tactical principles" is to overthrow history and win fame by cheating the world..

After the victory in the War of Resistance, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee in a timely manner decided upon the correct policy of establishing a firm base area in the Northeast. They transferred over 100,000 men from several of our older units in Northern Kiangsu, Shantung, Central Hopeh, Northern Shensi, and the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan area, and about 20,000 cadres from Yen-an, North China, and Central China and sent them into the Northeast and from these formed the Northeast Field Army. Chairman Mao's military thinking and the glorious traditions of our armies had an extremely firm base among the broad masses of fighters and commanders of the Northeast Field Army. Under the correct leadership and command of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, the broad masses of fighters and commanders of the Northeast Field Army, applying Chairman Mao's military thinking and operational principles, carrying forward and displaying the glorious traditions

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

16

of our armies, fought a series of battles of annihilation. For instance, from the end of October to the beginning of November 1946, in the battle of Hsin-k'ai-ling, our fourth column, in accordance with Chairman Mao's principle of concentrating an overwhelming superiority of forces to wipe out enemy forces one by one, massed eight regiments to fight three regiments of the enemy's 25th division, employed encirclement on all four sides and one by one destruction, achieved a victory in which over 7,000 of the enemy were wiped out. In the battle of Huai-te in May of 1947, our second column, in accordance with Chairman Mao's operational principles, used the absolute superiority of seven regiments to attack two enemy regiments of over 5,000 men in Huai-te: two regiments attacking from the west flank and two from the southwest flank constituted the main attack force, while from the north, east and south flanks, attacks were launched by auxiliary forces of one regiment each, with encirclement and attack from all sides and with a main point of attack, for which reasons total annihilation was the quick result. Of special importance was the Liao-ning-Shen-yang campaign wherein, under the personal deployment and command of Chairman Mao, a great, unprecedented battle of annihilation was fought, over 400,000 of Chiang's troops were wiped out, and the great victory of the Liberation of the Northeast was achieved. In contrast to these, battles fought according to Lin Piao's "six tactical principles" could only be battles to rout the enemy forces, battles of attrition. For instance, in June of 1947, Lin Piao, under conditions where our troops did not have absolute superiority, launched an attack upon a certain heavily fortified city. Our troops employed six divisions attacking on one flank from the west to the east, while another battalion launched a supporting attack to the northeast; that is, there was no encirclement, nor any breakthrough and pincer action. Although our troops fought bravely and tenaciously, because of the error in Lin Piao's leadership, after a month of fighting without result, the enemy was resupplied and our troops withdrew from the battle. Facts fully show that, in all the battles and campaigns in the northeastern battlefield, the victories were all victories of Chairman Mao's military thinking and his operational principles; all the battles to rout the enemy, the battles of attrition were, one and all, the evil results caused by Lin Piao's "six military principles."

Question: Why is it said that Lin Piao's "six military principles" are permeated with the line of idealistic understanding?

[Article continues on page three which is missing]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

17

PRINCIPLE OF PARTY CONTROL OVER ARMY REAFFIRMED

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 10 Nov 74 p 2

[Article: "Forever Adhere to the Principle of the Party Commanding the Gun", by K'o Cheng (2638 1767) - criticizing Lin Piao's crime of opposing the party's absolute leadership over the army]

[Text] The army must be placed under the absolute leadership of the party. This is a fundamental principle based on Marxism-Leninism and formulated for our army by Chairman Mao. It is a guarantee of ultimate victory for our army. Renegade and traitor Lin Piao had frantically opposed the absolute leadership of party over the army. He attempted to usurp the military power from the proletariat, to essentially change the proletarian characteristic of our army, and to turn our army into a tool for him to restore capitalism. Under the new situation of further extension, more intensive, and everlasting development of the criticize-Lin-and-Confucius campaign, we must conscientiously study Chairman Mao's military writings and further criticize this antiparty crime of Lin Piao. This endeavor will be of extremely important significance in heightening our awareness to resolutely implement Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and to strengthen the building of the party and the army.

I

Because of his counterrevolutionary needs, Lin Piao did his best to reverse the relationship between the party and the army. He nonsensically said such things as "the party grows out of the barrel of the gun," "the army is the foremost factor of all the factors in restoration. It is the very key and the very center of the core. As long as the army does not change its color, it can deal with the party, the government and the people." Lin Piao attempted to change "the party commands the gun" to "the gun commands the party" and to usurp the supreme power of the party and the state.

Marxism holds that the army is the main element of the state's political power. It belongs to a certain class and a certain political party and therefore it must serve the interest of a certain class. Historically speaking there has never been an army that has stood above classes, above parties, or divorced itself from classes and political parties and survived independently. To judge the class nature of an army, one must see which class and which political party leadership it is led by; which class and which political party line it adheres to, and which class interest it serves. This is the basic starting point for us to observe the relationship between the party and the army.

The Chinese Communist Party is a revolutionary party established in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and revolutionary style and "a vanguard organization that leads the proletariat and the revolutionary masses to fight against class enemies."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

18

Our party line is Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line. Our army has become the pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the people's soldiers serving the people wholeheartedly because it has always staunchly implemented Chairman Mao's revolutionary line under the leadership of the great Chinese Communist Party; because the party has continuously used Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and the party's program, line, and policy to educate the commanders and fighters of our army so that our army has a high degree of political awareness and has firmly maintained its correct political orientation under all circumstances; because during each revolutionary period the party and Chairman Mao have formulated definite combat missions for our army so that our army has become the tool to carry out the party's revolutionary political mission at all times. "The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything." Divorced from the party's leadership and party's line means our people's army will lose its spirit and its significance for existence. The Soviet Red Army, created by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, was a proletariat army that scored some monumental achievements for the Soviet people in their struggle to oppose armed interferences by the imperialists and in crushing fascist aggression. However, when the renegade clique of Khrushchev and Brezhnev usurped the leadership of the party and the State they pushed a counterrevolutionary revisionist line, and a great socialist country was turned into a socialist imperialist country. Subsequently the army became a tool for expansion and aggression externally and for suppression of the people internally. Historical facts have sufficiently proved both on the positive and negative sides that the nature of the party and the party line decides the nature of the army. This relationship between the leaders and the followers should not be confused. The reason Lin Piao concocted the reactionary fallacy of the army deciding the nature of the party is that as the headman of the bourgeois headquarters hiding in our party, his attempt to usurp the party's leadership over the army is to change the nature of the army so that the army can become his tool to launch his counterrevolutionary coup d'etat. Of course, there is no way that this type of criminal scheme can succeed. In fact, they have already become bankrupt.

Lin Piao's unbridled advocacy that the party "grows out of the barrel of the gun" is an intentional distortion and malicious attack on the history of our party and our army. Everyone knows that our party is a product of the combination of Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese workers' movement. "The sound of the cannons of the October Revolution gave us Marxism-Leninism." After the "May Fourth" movement the working class of China mounted the political stage independently for the first time. It gradually grasped the truth of Marxism-Leninism, enhanced its class awareness and recognized further the importance of forming a revolutionary political party consisting solely of its own class. Our party came into being under this type of historical condition. In the first three or four years after the founding of our party, as Chairman Mao said, we still did "not understand the importance of direct preparation

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

19

for war and the organization of the army;" later, "we received our "sad" experience after the failure of the revolution. Consequently there were the Nan-ch'ang Uprising, Autumn Harvest Uprising, and Canton Uprising and we entered the new period of creation of the Red Army. This fully explains that our army was created and established to overthrow the ruling imperialists, feudalists, and bureaucratic capitalists, to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, to carry on the socialist revolution and to achieve communism. To arrive at his criminal object Lin Piao wantonly reversed historical facts and advocated the theory that there must first be guns, then the party. His malicious intention was to undermine the leadership of the party in order to reach his criminal goal of using the gun to command the party.

Thus, we must expose the criminal acts of Lin Piao in tampering with the pertinent teaching of Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao has clearly pointed out in his November 1938 article entitled "The Problems of War and Strategy": "Our principle is that the party commands the gun and we absolutely will not allow the gun to command the party. On the other hand, the party can be created when we have the guns." It is quite obvious under the premise of the principle "the party commands the gun" "Chairman Mao elaborated the function of the people's army. In the protracted revolutionary war, our army truly played an important role in building the revolutionary government and in developing party strength. All these, however, can be achieved only under the correct leadership of the party and under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. It is entirely futile for Lin Piao to use his cunning schemes to take away the premise that "the party commands the gun" and to peddle his counterrevolutionary trash.

Military affairs have always been a part of politics, moreover, they serve the political line. Lin Piao, Confucius and Mencius followed the same reactionary political line and inevitably followed the same reactionary military line. Historically the Confusionists advocated the military line of "rites to control the army" so that the army will serve the reactionary political line of "restrain oneself and restore the rites." The reason Lin Piao advocated the bourgeois military line and opposed the absolute leadership of the party over the army is that he attempted to use the reactionary ideology of feudalism, capitalism, and revisionism to "control the army" so that the army will serve his political line of capitalist restoration. Thus, we can see clearly the ultra rightist nature of Lin Piao's bourgeois military line.

II

Lin Piao and his sworn followers openly disseminated the preposterous idea that the founder of the PLA is incapable of directing it. They said such stupid things as our army was "commanded directly" by Lin Piao, and they devised foolish schemes to usurp Chairman Mao's position of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20

leadership as well as the proletariat's military power.

Our great leader Chairman Mao was the founder of our army as well as its commander. These two facets are in total harmony with one another and cannot be separated. During the course of leading and commanding our army, Chairman Mao has created a new kind of people's army. The founding of an army of this kind by Chairman Mao has been solely for the purpose of leading and commanding the army to attain revolutionary victories. Chairman Mao's great revolutionary practice over the past several decades and the history of the Chinese revolution amply substantiate this point.

During the early period of our revolution, Chairman Mao combined the principles of Marxism and Leninism with the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution. He pointed out the great truth that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" and resolutely led the Chinese revolution down the path of armed struggle. During the first revolutionary war, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's capitulationism gave rise to a resolute struggle between himself and Chairman Mao, who repeatedly emphasized the importance of the party commanding the gun. Due to the hazards of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's right opportunist line, when Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, the representatives of the big landlords and the big bourgeois, betrayed the revolution and butchered workers and peasants, the broad masses of workers and peasants were caught defenseless and their stunning revolution went down to defeat. On 1 August 1927 the party led the Nan-ch'ang Uprising, firing the opening shot at the Kuomintang reactionaries. After the "August 7th" conference, Chairman Mao personally took command of the workers and peasants in Hunan and Kiangsi, staged the famous Autumn Harvest Uprising and established China's first Workers and Peasants' Red Army. He further led the troops up into the Ching-kang Mountains, set up the first peasant revolutionary base, and for the sake of the Chinese revolution, initiated the new lines of the countryside surrounding the cities and the armed usurpation of political power. During the early stages of the struggle in the Ching-kang Mountains, Chairman Mao built party organizations at each level, formulated the important principle of "organizing the party branch on a company basis," and placed the army under the leadership of the party. In the glorious Ku-t'ien Conference Resolution of December 1929, Chairman Mao comprehensively summarized the experiences of our army during the early stages of its formation, pointed out the direction of its formation and stipulated that proletarian ideology should be used in leading the army and thereby brought about the formation of an army which was wholly in line with the principles of Marxism and Leninism. Chairman Mao duly summarized the experiences of our country's revolution and in turn set forth a set of military principles which coincided with the requirements of the Chinese revolutionary war. In this way, during the process of formulating a correct political line, Chairman Mao simultaneously established for our party a wholly Marxist-Leninist military line. The people's army, the people's war and the strategies and tactics necessary

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

21

in fighting for the people constitute the fundamental substance of this military line. This line is the life line of our army and has constituted a basic guarantee that our army would progress from nothing to something, from a small army to a large one and from one victory to another.

Not only did Chairman Mao formulate a correct military line for us, but while directing our army, he also brought about the thorough implementation of this military line in our army, penetrating the minds of men and bringing into play an invincible force in battle. That our army was able to score successive great victories in the revolutionary war, and, moreover, perform meritorious deeds for the people while engaged in the struggle to safeguard the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist motherland, was all a result of the leadership and command of Chairman Mao. Historical facts tell us that opportunists have always sought to employ every conceivable means to usurp the authority over the army exercised by Chairman Mao and the Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao so as to change Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Under the circumstances, should our army one day depart from Chairman Mao's command, it will encounter unavoidable set backs and defeat. When the central revolutionary base area was resisting the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, Wang Ming's "Left" opportunist line occupied a dominant position, to the exclusion of Chairman Mao's leadership and command of the Red Army. The result was that our army suffered grave setbacks, leaving it no choice other than to depart from the revolutionary base area and embark on the Long March. In June 1935, after the victorious gathering of the first and fourth armies of the Red Army, Chang Kuo-t'ao caused dissention and resisted the leadership and commands of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee, which resulted in the Red Army's suffering severe set backs. Today, having penetratingly studied the military works of Chairman Mao and having exposed and criticized the criminal acts of Lin Piao in the Liaohsi-Shenyang and Peking-Tientsin Campaigns, the entire party, the whole army and the nation as a whole all recognize even more clearly that the greatest victories won during the history of our army were won under the personal leadership and command of Chairman Mao. During the Liaoning-Shenyang and Peking-Tientsin Campaigns, Lin Piao started from the standpoint of right opportunism and continuously resisted the strategic decisions of Chairman Mao and obstinately opposed the strategy of waging decisive wars against the enemy. That Lin Piao stood in total opposition to Chairman Mao's directives pertaining to operational policy and deployment and battle organization and direction, in actuality, arose from his desire to prevent the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek, the liberation of China and the carrying out of the revolution to the end. Our great leader Chairman Mao resolutely rejected Lin Piao's interference and subversion. He duly issued brilliant directives covering everything from battle deployment to concrete operational methods, all of which insured great victories in battle.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

22

Setting out with the veil aim of taking over the party and usurping power, Lin Piao and his sworn followers issued rumors and falsehoods in order to beautify Lin Piao, making him out to be the "direct commander" of our army. They said that the Liaoning-Shenyang and Peking-Tientsin Campaigns were "first initiated" and "commanded directly" by him. They played him up as being a "remarkable commander," a "military genius," an "ever victorious general," even the "creator" of our army. Their strong counterrevolutionary designs caused them to blatantly lose sight of historical facts. An historical fact is that prior to going up into the Ching-kang Mountains, Lin Piao went AWOL for a short period and was a shameless deserter. During the Ching-kang Mountains period, he lost his nerve when faced with the Kuomintang's white terror, and his rightist tendencies began to show, in that he doubted that "the Red Flag could last much longer." While resisting the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, he actively followed the Wang Ming line and executed in a big way the so-called "short, swift thrust" and passive defense tactics, causing the Red Army to suffer severe losses. During the War of Resistance against Japan, he rejected putting into operation Chairman Mao's strategy of "independent guerilla operations in the mountain areas" while engaged in operations in Shansi and carried out in a big way Wang Ming and P'eng Te-huai's tactic of "mobile guerrilla warfare", opposing going all out to mobilize the masses and building an anti-Japanese base area. Later on, he further avoided difficult struggles and hid abroad writing anti-party essays, shamelessly praising the autocrat and traitor to the people, Chiang Kai-shek. After the conclusion of the War of resistance against Japan, at a key moment when China faced a decisive war involving two prospects and two fates, Lin Piao once again stood by the side of the renegade, spy and stooge, Liu Shao-ch'i in vehemently opposing Chairman Mao's directive concerning the resolute and planned attack to smash the Kuomintang and in openly espousing "a desire to cooperate with the Kuomintang in the northeast" and "a desire to get the northeast and nation as a whole to progress toward a new stage of peace and democracy." During the Liberation War, he stubbornly stood on the side of the right opportunists and continuously opposed Chairman Mao's operational strategies and commands and disrupted Chairman Mao's great strategic plans. He further fabricated the so-called "six tactical principles" which are in opposition to Chairman Mao's "ten great principles of operation." When the American imperialists invaded Korea, he opposed China's resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, protecting our homes and defending our country; and he rejected our getting involved in the Korea war. In 1960, after usurping a leading position in the Military Commission, he once again recklessly promoted a bourgeois military line and rampantly subverted the building of our army and the preparations for wars of aggression. All of this fully shows that Lin Piao not only was not the "direct commander" of our army but that he was a right opportunist who opposed Chairman Mao's proletarian military line and a ringleader who subverted and played havoc with the correct commands of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

23

Chairman Mao is our nation's great leader of the proletariat and laboring peoples as well as the leader of our party. The leadership of the party over the army, basically speaking, means the leadership and command of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao. To recognize or not recognize Chairman Mao as the creator and commander of our army is essentially a question involving our adherence to or our changing of the proletarian nature of our army. Lin Piao and his ilk took as a model Confucius' dictum "restrain oneself and restore the rites;" and like Confucius, who sought with all his might to usurp military power for the sake of the fallen slave owning class, they desperately sought to grasp military power for the sake of the overthrown landlord class and the bourgeoisie. They resorted to all sorts of tricks and schemes so as to invent stories about and usurp Chairman Mao's position of leadership over our army and proclaimed that "the armed forces of the entire country; should obey the "centralized unified command" of the bourgeois "headquarters" headed by Lin Piao. At the same time, they followed in the footsteps of Confucius and Mencius in instituting on a grand scale "hereditary ranks and emoluments" and boasted about petty fascist elements as being "operational authorities" and "upcoming commanders," with him "commanding all" and "mobilizing all." The PLA, however, is a great army which is loyal to the party, to the people and to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. From the outset, in every action, we have persisted in following the commands of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao. Any ambitionist or schemer who foolishly plots to usurp the military power of the proletariat and people-at-large will only fail. The results most assuredly will be that they will command nothing, mobilize nothing and bring their absolute defeat and self-destruction in the end.

III

In order to oppose the party's absolute control of the army, Lin Piao resorted to political tricks to explain that the changes in our army's duties during a certain period of time [GPCR] were the result of "a change in its position," and he stated that "not only do we command the military," but we also "command the party," "control the government," and "manage all financial affairs," all of this in a vain attempt to destroy the centralized leadership of local party committees and place the army in a position high above the party's leadership.

Chairman Mao has instructed us saying, "The communist party is the supreme organizational form of the proletariat. It is the leadership of the communist party that allows the leading role played by the proletariat to come into being." "Of the seven sectors -- industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army, the government, and the party -- it is the party that exercises overall leadership." Under the unified leadership of the party central committee, the highest level party committee in a region should carry out centralized leadership over all sectors. This is a basic principle for handling the relation-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

24

ships between the party and all other organizations, it is a glorious tradition of our party and our army, it is a concrete embodiment of the principle that "the party commands the gun," and it is also one of Chairman Mao's consistent ideas. As far back as in the Ku-t'ien Conference Resolution, Chairman Mao had already clearly stipulated that our army must be placed under the absolute leadership of the party when he said: "The party must actively attend to and discuss military work." In addition, he pointed out that mistaken tendencies that are divorced from the principle of party leadership, such as the purely military viewpoint that existed at that time in the Red Army, "if allowed to develop, would involve the danger of estrangement from the masses, control of the government by the army and departure from proletarian leadership -- it would be to take the path of warlordism like the Kuomintang army." The "Resolution" also clearly stipulated that we must "arouse the local party organizations to criticize the party organizations in the Red Army and the organs of mass political power to criticize the Red Army itself, in order to influence the party organizations and the officers and men of the Red Army." During the War of Resistance Against Japan, Chairman Mao also personally sponsored and formulated the "Decision Regarding Unifying the Party Leadership In the Anti-Japanese Base Areas and Regulating the Relationships Between the Various Organizations" in which he clearly pointed out that the degree of unification and centralization of the leadership in the base areas should be expressed in each base area having a unified party committee which has leadership over everything; the party committees at the various levels in the base areas should not merely be party committees in charge of the local work [of the party alone], but should be the leading organs that unify the party, the government, the army, and the masses in their respective areas. After the entire country achieved liberation, Chairman Mao also frequently emphasized the need for local party committees to grasp military affairs and he stressed the importance of the army accepting the centralized leadership of the local party committees under the new historical conditions. These brilliant directives by Chairman Mao represent further important developments of Marxist-Leninist ideology on army building, and are the basic component parts of Chairman Mao's line on army building. They serve to permanently place our army under the absolute leadership of the party and the supervision of the masses of the people, and they maintain the essence of the people's army and are the basic guarantee that it will serve the people heart and soul. During the past several decades, our army has truly been under the centralized leadership of the party, and it has been in close cooperation with all other organizations to form a unified fighting force which has mobilized millions-upon-millions of the masses and the valorous ranks of our revolutionary army to successfully complete all of the combat duties given to it by the party and the people.

The People's Liberation Army is an armed body charged with carrying out the political tasks of the revolution; it is responsible for the three great tasks of fighting wars, doing mass work, and engaging in production, and this makes it a fighting force as well as a work and production

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25

force, these being consistent parts of Chairman Mao's ideas and the glorious traditions of our army. Throughout the long period of the revolutionary war, our army was engaged both in fighting and in carrying out "such important tasks as doing propaganda work among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up party organizations." After the entire country was liberated, at the same time it was responsible for safeguarding the dictatorship of the proletariat, our army participated enthusiastically in assisting in the building of socialism. During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, our army carried on and further developed its glorious tradition of doing mass work, and, based on Chairman Mao's great strategic plan, carried out the glorious tradition of "three-supports and two-militaries" and struggled to protect and further develop the great accomplishments of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and consolidate and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. All of this was conducted under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and under the leadership of the party. Although its specific duties changed from time to time, its "three main tasks" have never changed, and our army's position in accepting the centralized leadership of local party committees will also never change. Lin Piao deliberately ignored the consistency between [the principle that] "the party commands the gun" and [the formula of] "the three-supports and two-militaries," and he uttered such nonsense as, the army's "position has changed," and it should now "command the party" and "control the government." His devious intention was to destroy the party's solidarity and unity in a vain attempt to place the army in a position high above the party's leadership, use the gun to "deal with" the party, the government, and the people, and to change the army of the proletariat into his own tool for suppressing the people and the revolution. However, unity as one under the unified leadership of the party is the common hope of the entire party, the whole army, and all the people of the country, and it is also an inevitable law for the development of the history of socialism in China. All those who resort to separatist activities will in the long run always be repudiated by the party and the masses. For having so strenuously opposed the party's absolute leadership of the army and the centralized leadership of local party committees, and for having driven a wedge between the party and the army, Lin Piao and his ilk were fated to meet a doom from which there was no escape.

The basic question in the struggle between the two military lines within the party is whether to uphold and strengthen or to destroy and oppose the party's absolute leadership over the army. There was not a one of the long line of leaders of the opportunist line that did not oppose the party's absolute leadership of the army in their efforts to carry out their heinous plots of usurping the power of the party and restoring capitalism. Ch'en Tu-hsiu's capitulationism, Chang Kuo-t'ao's separatism and warlordism, Wang Ming's "everything must pass through the united front," Kao Kang's "Theory On the Army and the Party," and P'eng Te-hai's "system of one-man leadership," although different in form, were all essentially opposed to the party's absolute leadership of the party and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

26

dedicated to supporting the bourgeoisie's efforts to contend with the party and the people for military power. Lin Piao gathered together the great accomplishments of these leaders of the opportunist line, and then went on to viciously destroy and oppose the party's absolute leadership of the army. He resorted to all sorts of tricks to reverse the relationship between the party and the army, he attempted in vain to usurp Chairman Mao's position of leadership over our army, and he shamelessly admitted that he emulated Chiang Kai-shek, saying that "Chiang Kai-shek seized the military power of the country and thereby seized the country." In one fell swoop this exposes his counterrevolutionary ambitions.

Chairman Mao has taught us that the gun must always be held in the hands of the party and the people, and must absolutely never be allowed to become the tool of a careerist. The People's Liberation Army will always be loyal to the party, to Chairman Mao, and to the people, and any careerist and conspirator who thinks he can alter our army's proletarian nature or usurp the leading position of the party and Chairman Mao is indulging in some silly and fantastic daydreaming. We must definitely thoroughly criticize the vicious acts of Lin Piao and his sworn followers in opposing the party's absolute leadership of the army, and we must adhere to the principle of the party commanding the gun and see to it that our army advances triumphantly forward along Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, forever under the absolute leadership of the party!

CONFERENCE REVIEWS TRAINING, CALLS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Peking CHIH-FANG-CHUN PAO 16 Nov 74 p 1

[Article: "A Favorable Situation Emerges in Military Training Throughout the Army"]

[Excerpts] This year under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and the impetus of the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, the army launched a vigorous mass movement in military training. An army-wide exchange of experiences in the criticism of Lin Piao's bourgeois military line and in the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. These experiences had served to enhance military training. It analyzed and discussed the situation and the tasks in military training. The comrades in attendance at the conference believed that along with the widespread, thorough-going and protracted development of the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, military training is being carried out very well in the troops units.

During the year, military units have earnestly studied the military writings of Chairman Mao and thoroughly criticized the bourgeois military line of Lin Piao, thus enabling the broad mass of commanders to draw a clearer line of demarcation between two military lines and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

27

to elevate the level of their consciousness in implementing Chairman Mao's military line. At the conference, representatives from various basic-level units, including the 6th company of a unit of the Peking Garrison Area, the 8th company of a unit of the Peking Unit, and the 8th company of a unit of the Shenyang Unit introduced their experiences along these lines.

This year all units earnestly carried out Chairman Mao's grand strategy "grasp revolution and promote production and other work and preparedness against war." The comrades in attendance at the conference recognized that if the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius is carried out thoroughly and if the line awareness of the broad mass of cadres and fighters is raised, then unity can be enhanced, the relationship between revolution and military training can be put into proper perspective, and the masses' initiative can be fully manifested. For example, a certain speed boat fleet of the Navy has raised the success ratio in torpedo attack by seven percent in daytime and 13 percent at night. An airborne group of the Air Force completed this year's military training tasks in the period from January to August and achieved excellent results.

In light of the characteristics of modern warfare, antitank training was accorded special emphasis in this year's military training. In Nanking and Lanchow, some units have set up antitank training posts for the training of a large number of antitank cadres. Some troop units have assisted the militia in training antitank cadres. The 4th company of a unit of the K'un-ming Unit studied Chairman Mao's writing on the relationship between man and weapons and the first machinegun company of a unit of the Wuhan Unit put special emphasis on the role of the theoretical cadres in antitank training and inspired everyone to criticize Lin Piao's "weapons are above all" theory from the dialectical materialist standpoint. This year's military training also emphasized the development of better instruction teams, the cultivation of red and expert cadres and the improvement in the organizational and command abilities of basic-level cadres. The cadres training program this year given by instruction teams at various levels has shifted from basic technical and tactical training to training in troop commands. The party committee of a unit of the Canton Unit regarded the training of basic-level cadres as an important part in unit building. For the past few years, it has assigned division and regimental cadres on 593 occasions to "teach, lead and assist" various instruction teams and to share their experiences in political-ideological work during the revolutionary war.

This year's military training produced a more thorough mobilization of the broad masses [of military personnel] and better results in training reforms and technical innovations than in 1973. Touching scenes like "officers teaching soldiers," "soldiers teaching officers," and "soldiers teaching soldiers" were a common occurrence on the training grounds. The conference believed that in the future the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius must continue to be

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28

developed broadly, deeply and over a long period of time, that military training must adhere to the party's basic line, that party committee leadership and revolutionary unity must be strengthened, that model experience must be summarized and promoted, and that ideological-political work and military training must be further improved.

UNIT 6427 TANK COMPANY STRESSES WAR PREPAREDNESS

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 20 Nov 74

[Article: "Earnestly Carry Out War Preparedness Education, Enhance War Preparedness Work"]

[Excerpts] The party branch of the 4th tank company of Unit 6427, in conjunction with the current situation and the tasks and the ideological state of the company during the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, has adopted various methods to carry out ideological education in war preparedness, thus effectively promoting its war preparedness work. For a time, some of the comrades of the motor vehicle operators section neglected maintenance work on their vehicles after night training exercises and failed to pay proper attention to minor repairs. In its investigation, the party branch discovered that some of the comrades, lulled by the thoughts of peace, were not doing well in war preparedness work. It then organized the comrades of the company to study Lenin's famous work "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" and the party's basic line. From these studies, the comrades came to understand that the competition for power waged under the pretext of "detente" between the two giants, the United States and the Soviet Union, is the basic reason for international tension. This served to strengthen their war preparedness concept and inspired them to carry out this task with positive enthusiasm. From this, the comrades of the motor vehicle operators section have been earnestly inspecting their vehicles after each night training exercise, thus keeping them in good maintenance and in combat-ready condition.

In grasping ideological education on war preparedness, the party branch of the 4th company also paid attention to coordinating this task with the company's changing work tasks. In April 1974, the company was given the task of being the advanced company in a night training exercise. A small number of its comrades believed that the purpose of an advanced company serves only to give some technical experience to other companies and thus did not carry out their training earnestly. Faced with this situation, the party branch organized the company's cadres and fighters to study Chairman Mao's great teaching "the whole party should pay attention to warfare, study military affairs, and be prepared to fight." From this, the company came to understand that because the purpose of night training is to improve its fighting

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

29

strength, it must undertake military training with actual combat requirements in mind and carry it out diligently and strictly. With their understanding of the purpose of training thusly heightened, the comrades of the company have been earnestly summarizing their training experiences, improving their military technical skills, achieving excellent results in target practice with live ammunition, and acquiring some experience for the entire unit.

In assigning work tasks to the company, the party branch also pays close attention to explaining the relationship between completing a task and doing well in war preparedness work. In addition to carrying out a monthly review of the situation in war preparedness education tasked to it by higher authorities, the party branch also conducts weekly sessions for reviewing war preparedness work and newspaper reading in the company.

PLA UNIT INFORMATION, DESIGNATIONS

[The following PLA unit numbers and information were taken from the Peking CHIH-FANG-CHUN PAO of the date indicated in parentheses at the end of each item.]

Unit 0269--Wang Chia-k'ai [3769 1367 0418] of this unit is signatory to an article entitled "Criticism of the Fallacy of Wang Ch'ung's "Theory of Genius!" (23 Nov 74)

Unit 1665--In addition to setting up a theoretists study group, opening a night school and setting up a library, the party branch of the second artillery company of this unit periodically analyzed the situation and adopted measures so that the reading and study of Marxist and Leninist works and the works of Chairman Mao were regularly carried out and outstanding results were achieved. (23 Nov 74)

Unit 3009--Leading members of the party branch of the reconnaissance company of this unit and hardcore cadre theorists are shown exchanging study experience. (23 Nov 74)

Unit 7857--During the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius, the first company of this unit seriously carried out the party's policy on nationalities so that the cadres and fighters of Yi, Miao, Tibetan, Na-hsi and Han nationalities in the company united together and did a good job of completing their tasks in war preparedness training and national defense work. Chang Tao-ch'i [1728 6670 0796], a Han, is identified as the company commander. Ma Chien-ch'eng [7456 1696 2052], a Miao, is identified as the political officer. He joined the military in 1969. Li Hsiang-yen [2621 4382 6056], a Han has been the deputy political officer since 1966. (23 Nov 74)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

30

BRIEF

PLA CADRE PARTICIPATE IN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS -- Ch'en Yao-hua [7115 5069 5478], the secretary of the party committee of a certain engineering regiment of the Canton Unit, Lo Jung-ch'un [5012 5816 2504], a member of the standing committee of the party committee, and Hu Yen-fu [0729 1693 1133], a deputy secretary of the party committee, are mentioned in an article describing the extent to which the cadre in this regiment have heeded Chairman Mao's call that cadre do their utmost to participate in collectivized production and labor. In participating in the regiment's own construction projects, all of which are said to be located up in mountainous and hilly terrain, seven of the nine members of the regiment's standing committee have put in an average of over 150 days per annum working at the construction sites, with the highest rate being 210 days per annum. (Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 20 Nov 74)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

31

POLITICAL

PEKING MILITIA ACTIVE IN CURRENT CLASS STRUGGLE

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 20 Nov 74 p 1

[Article: "In the Course of the Movement To Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, the Workers' Militia In the Capital Have Earnestly Studied the Shanghai Militia's Fresh Experiences In Militia Building and Have Achieved Great Accomplishments By Participating In the Class Struggle In Society']

[Summary] For more than the past year, and under the close care of Chairman Mao and the party central committee, as well as under the leadership of the Peking Municipal Committee and party committees at various levels, the workers' militia in the capital has earnestly studied the Shanghai militia's fresh experiences in militia building and gone out of the factories to actively participate in the class struggle in society. Taking the party's basic line as their guide, the broad masses of militiamen have enthusiastically taken part in the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, and, in close cooperation with the garrison unit(s) and public security organs, have made contributions and fully played their role as the main force of the working class in protecting Chairman Mao, the party central committee, the capital, and socialist revolution and construction.

During the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, the workers' militia went out into society to take the lead in studying and criticizing with the masses of the people, thereby enabling the movement to develop more deeply. For example, components of the workers' militia living in the Ta-fang chia residential area of the East City District assisted the party branch of the residential committee by holding six separate congresses for criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius and four hardcore study classes, by setting up six mass criticism columns, by organizing 24 large-scaled mass criticism meetings of various types and more than 50 criticism meetings in several homes and courtyards, and by writing more than 600 big-character posters.

In order to smash the reactionary elements opposed to the movement, the workers' militia at various levels, in close cooperation with public security departments, has encouraged and relied on the masses to crush the criminal plots of a handful of class enemies. Since August of last year, the workers' militia has very vigilantly patrolled the main streets, the small lanes, the railroad stations, the markets, and the parks. Workers' militia organization at all levels have had the cooperation of the masses in casting out an extensive net by which to control and prevent sabotage by class enemies,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

32

and as a result social order in the capital has been better and better. In addition to taking care of ordinary work in public security and protection, the capital's workers' militia pays special attention to public security and protection duties during holidays important political events, and activities related to foreign affairs. Last August they were given their first important political task of handling security arrangements for the Tenth-Party Congress [literally, "protecting the Tenth Party Congress"]. To protect our country's 25th National Day celebrations, the workers' militia carried out ideological mobilization and organizational preparations in early September, making certain to cooperate closely with concerned departments in carrying out the various security arrangements. During the actual festivities, they did an outstanding job of handling their assigned tasks.

While participating in the class struggle in society, the workers' militia in the capital has taken educating the youths as one of its chief responsibilities. Teams of workers' militiamen have worked with concerned departments in going out into the streets to educate the broad masses of young people in a wide variety of ways, including the holding of part-time political classes, the writing of new songs, collecting revolutionary drawings and pictures, and telling revolutionary stories. During winter and summer vacations, they take the youths out to visit the monuments of revolutionary heroes and exhibitions on class [struggle] education, and they arrange for old Red Army fighters and old workers to relate their experiences, describe the glorious traditions, and recall the bitterness of the past and contrast it with the current excellent situation. These actions have brought about an improvement in the youths' consciousness of class and line struggles, and the patient assistance rendered by the workers' militiamen has enabled the very small number of youths corrupted by bourgeois thinking to improve themselves. Working with the parents, retired workers, teachers, and policemen, the workers' militiamen achieved great results in bringing about an ideological transformation among these corrupted youths.

During the past year or more, the workers' militia in the capital has received its most vivid lessons from its participation in the great storm of class struggle. The worker militiamen have valiantly fought at the front line of the class struggle, fearing neither hardship, weariness, nor threats, intiminations, and reprisals from the class enemies. In protecting the great accomplishments of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, Sun Ching-tao, a worker militiaman in the Peking Gear Plant, gloriously sacrificed his precious life while valiantly struggling against a small handful of class enemies who sought to wreck the revolutionary order in the capital during the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

33

The workers' militia in the capital has performed numerous good deeds for the people. The militiamen have helped the elderly and cared for the young, returned lost money and articles they found in the streets, escorted lost children back to their homes, and searched for lost relatives, and for these acts they have been warmly praised by the masses.

PLA COMPANY WORKS OUT PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 23 Nov 74 p 3

[Article: "While Correctly Handling Internal Contradictions, Units and Go Forward"]

[Summary] The cadres and fighters of the eleventh company of a certain regiment of the engineering corps in the Canton Unit have consciously applied Chairman Mao's principle on the correct handling of contradictions among the people so that each contradiction between comrades and between the leaders and those being led were handled properly.

Contradictions Between A Minority and A Han. Before Wei Ch'uan-pao, a fighter of Yao nationality had joined the army, he had only one year of schooling and could neither read a newspaper or a book nor speak standard Mandarin. After he joined the second squad, Wei seldom spoke to the other comrades or at study meetings. This led some comrades to ask, "How can we unite with a minority fighter whose speech and customs are different?" Some comrades even went so far as to grumble that Wei was the millstone of the squad. The squad leader, however, felt that this was a question of the party's policy on minorities not being carried out in the company. He personally made Wei's problems his own problems and enthusiastically helped Wei study culture and theory. With his help Wei studied hard and made rapid progress. Before long, however, the squad leader was transferred and he gave the task of helping Wei to the new squad leader Hsiang Wan-lin.

New squad leader Hsiang began teaching Wei how to write. But after a short time Wei did not make much progress. Why? Hsiang discovered that Wei did not want to trouble the other members of the squad by asking many questions. His reluctance was due to the fact that some comrades were impatient with his many questions. Often Wei would ask the meaning of a word seven or eight times before understanding it. Some comrades felt Wei was too slow in his studies. Upon learning this Hsiang Wan-lin called the whole squad together and explained to them that Wei's cultural level was low not because he was unwilling to study but rather because of the long period of rule by the Kuomintang reactionaries and the persecution of the revisionist line of Liu Shao-ch'i. It was not that Wei was slow with his studies but rather it was that the squad did not give him enough help.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

54

Thereafter the comrades of the squad carried out the party's policy on minorities and even more patiently help Wei study standard Mandarin.

Contradictions Between A Leader and A Fighter. Within the company there were often contradictions between comrades and between those leading and those being led because viewpoints were not unanimous. The cadres of the eleventh company not only faced these contradictions squarely but also actively worked to change them, thus promoting unity within the revolutionary ranks.

When political officer T'an went to the mess squad to give a lecture on criticizing Lin Piao's bourgeois military line, he found that the disposition of a fighter was not good. However the fighter's spirits had been very good when he had joined the military. When political officer T'an talked with some of the comrades of the mess squad he soon learned the reason. After the new squad leader had arrived at the squad, he held several study sessions and discovered that the fighter had several shortcomings in his studies. Fearing that the fighter would be transferred, the squad leader ordered him to study on Sundays. But the fighter felt he was being harassed.

Political officer T'an made a detailed analysis of the situation. He felt that although both men were responsible for the contradiction existing between them, the squad leader bore the greater responsibility. Therefore political officer T'an had a heart to heart talk with the squad leader. After T'an explained the model role played by communist party members and told the story of how a squad leader had used his own body to protect a fighter, the squad leader saw that he should have been more patient and helped the fighter more.

That evening the squad leader and the fighter had a heart to heart talk. Now they help one another and are like an older brother and a younger brother.

Contradictions Between Equals. Contradictions exist everywhere. They exist between fighters and also between cadres.

Once upon returning from a study session held by the regiment, political officer T'an wanted to hold two day's of study classes for the cadres. This was in accordance with the demands of the upper echelons. But company commander Wang felt that since it was the rainy season, collapsed sections of a construction project might not be found if the cadres stayed inside studying. The company commander wanted to delay the study sessions a few days. Political officer T'an felt the company commander was too concerned about his construction project and not concerned enough about study. Likewise the company commander felt political officer T'an was too concerned about study and neglected the construction project. Because the two cadres were at odds, it soon affected the company's work. When one of the fighters criticized both of them, political officer T'an realized that he was wrong in endangering the project and made a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

35

self criticism at the party branch meeting. Upon hearing the self-criticism company commander Wang was deeply moved. He then said that he had paid too much attention to work and not enough to studying. After the two had united their thinking, both study and work were arranged so that neither were neglected.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Item: Hsien-yu Sugar Mill
[0103 3266 4743 0617]

Location: Hsien-yu, Fukien, PRC

Data: By 25 March, this mill successfully fulfilled its task for the "new" sugar cane pressing season. Its gross output value and sugar output volume both topped the state plan by 9.8 percent. The output of solvents and alcohol registered increases of 63 and 13 percent, respectively, over the same 1973 period.

This mill also used liquid waste from the production processes to produce 14,000 tons of ammonium humate for farm production and delivered to the local communes and production brigades some 9,600 tons of silt to be used as fertilizer.

Source: Foochow FU-CHIEN JIH-PAO 31 Mar 74 p 1-b

CONFIDENTIAL

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Item: Chien-ou Coal Mine
[1696 3917 3561 4349]

Location: Fukien Province, PRC

Data: In 1958, this 50-year-old mine's raw coal output reached 9,000 tons. During March 1974, this mine produced, up to 24 March, 6,512 tons of raw coal, surpassing the total output of January and February.

Source: Foochow FU-CHIEN JIH-PAO 31 Mar 74 p 1

CONFIDENTIAL

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Item: Shuang-tung Salt Field
[7175 2639 7770 1034]

Location: Tung-shan Hsien, Fukien, PRC

Data: This salt field contributed substantially to Tung-shan Hsien's 12.4-percent increase in salt output for the first quarter of 1974 over the comparable period of 1973. Workers here successfully test-manufactured a "salt harvester" to speed up the production processes.

Source: Foochow FU-CHIEN JIH-PAO 31 Mar 74 p 1-d

CONFIDENTIAL

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Item: San-ming City Standard Parts Plant
[0005 2494 1579 2871 0402 0115 0617]

Location: San-ming City, Fukien Province, PRC

Data: This plant completed its output plan for the first quarter of 1974 ahead of schedule. Its output volume showed an increase of 22.8 percent and output value rose 41 percent, as compared with the corresponding period of 1973.

Source: Foochow FU-CHIEN JIH-PAO 31 Mar 74 p 1-c

CONFIDENTIAL

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Item: K'un-ming Iron and Steel Mill
[2492 2494 6921 6993 0617]

Location: K'un-ming, Yunnan, PRC

Data: A team of workers and technicians at this mill's Steel Refining Branch Plant recently succeeded in producing high-grade silicon steel, an important material for manufacturing electric motors, generators, and transformers. Tests showed that the chemical composition and forging quality of the silicon steel produced by this plant is up to standard.

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 29 Oct 73 p 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Item: Yung-shan Hsien Industrial and Communications Department
[3057 0810 4905 1562 2814 0074 6639 6752 7024]

Location: Yung-shan Hsien, Yunnan, PRC

Data: With the help of units concerned and after more than one year of arduous efforts, this department successfully built for the first time a 600-ton capacity steamer, "Chin-chiang No 1" [6855 3068 0001 5714] and conducted a successful trial run of the vessel along the Chin-sha River during the last 10 days of June 1973. The Chin-sha River extends some 400 kilometers inside Yung-shan Hsien of Yunnan Province.

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 29 Oct 73 p 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Item: Pi-chiang Agricultural Implements Plant
[4310 3068 6593 0367 0617]

Location: Pi-chiang Hsien, Yunnan, PRC

Data: This plant, primarily engaged in the production of small iron implements, has substantially increased its plow-share output by employing iron casting molds, instead of clay molds, and has reduced production cost per catty from 4 yuan to about 7 chiao [6039]. The workers here also designed and built a set of punch and die and "bending" mold to produce a new-type hoe.

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 29 Oct 73 p 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Item: Yun-nan Province Geological Bureau
[7189 0589 4164 0966 6347 1444]

Location: Yunnan Province, PRC

Data: The No 7 Subteam of this bureau's Hydrological Team recently discovered a new coalfield in the Yang-wu area of Hsin-p'ing Hsien while conducting a hydrological survey. The new coalfield, which has a "definite" amount of deposits, is shallow and has thick coal seams, and the coal quality is excellent.

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 29 Oct 73 p 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Item: Mi-tu Hsien Agricultural Machinery Administration Station
[1736 3256 4905 6593 2623 4619 3810 4541]

Location: Mi-tu Hsien, Yunnan, PRC

Data: Employing the method of "ants gnawing a piece of bone," this station successfully test-manufactured 3 single cylinder hydraulic horizontal-type earth shovels. Tests showed that the performance of these shovels was up to the designed requirements. Personnel of this station are exerting efforts to produce more of this type of shovels to aid local farmland construction projects.

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 29 Oct 73 p 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Item: Hua-ning Agricultural Implement Cooperative Plant
[5478 1380 6593 0367 0678 0155 0617]

Location: Hua-ning Hsien, Yunnan, PRC

Data: This plant was given the task to produce 150 grain threshers in 1973. By the end of July, it turned out 156 improved threshers made of iron. In addition, the plant prefulfilled, by the end of July, its farm implement production quota for the fall harvest, with the gross output value topping that of the same 1973 period by 71.3 percent.

Recently, workers here produced a batch of foot-pedaled and power-driven threshers, as well as a batch of thresher parts that wear out easily.

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 29 Oct 73 p 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Item: Yun-nan Province Geological Bureau
[0061 0589 4164 4574 6347 1444]

Location: Probably K'un-ming, Yunnan, PRC

Data: During the past 3 years, the copper smelting team of the No 1 Casting Group at this bureau's Ore Prospecting Machinery Plant has recovered and utilized nearly 25 tons of copper scraps to make copper sleeves, bearings, bars, and other materials, effecting a savings of some 18,000 yuan. In the past 3 years, using a copper smelter built by the workers themselves, the casting crew of the aforementioned ore prospecting machinery plant used copper scraps to produce 15,000 copper parts for repairing and manufacturing prospecting equipment.

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 3 Nov 73 p 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Item: Hsi-meng Wa Autonomous Hsien Agricultural Machinery Plant
[6007 4145 2469 5261 3112 4905 6593 2623 0617]

Location: Hsi-meng Wa Autonomous Hsien, Yunnan, PRC

Data: Since the beginning of 1973, this plant has turned out more than 3,000 farm machines and implements, including plowshares, winnowing machines, and corn shellers, and repaired over 1,000 farming machines and implements.

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 29 Oct 73 p 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Item: K'ai-yuan Forest Machinery Plant
[7073 6678 2651 2814 2623 2750 0617]

Location: K'ai-yuan Hsien, Yunnan, PRC

Data: Compared with the corresponding period of 1972, this plant consumed 70,000 KWH less electricity and registered a 46.5-percent increase in output value during the January-September 1973 period.

By modifying 3 pieces of old equipment, improving the piston-making process, and installing a production line, this plant's machine shop was able to boost its monthly piston output by sixfold, raise the rate of up-to-standard products to over 90 percent, and lower the power consumption of products per unit "substantially". Improved

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 11 Nov 73 p 2

1 of 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Item: K'ai-yuan Forest Machinery Plant
[7073 6678 2651 2814 2623 2750 0617]

Location: K'ai-yuan Hsien, Yunnan, PRC

Data: work operations and better cutting tools permitted Machine Group No 2 to cut the time for processing one intake valve from 30 to 12 minutes and to reduce power consumption as well.

Source: K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 11 Nov 73 p 2

2 of 2

CONFIDENTIAL